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A Framework for Evaluation of Public Policy
on the Use of Aaricultural Chemicals
Jacques G. Gros and Earl R. Swanson
Although the contribution of chemicals to increased
agricultural production is generally recognized, the poten-
tially hazardous side-effects of some of these chemicals are
causing a reassessment of their use (National Research Council,
1972; Commoner, 1971; Garman, 1972). For rational public-
policy choices to be made, simultaneous account needs to be
taken of the contribution of chemicals to agricultural produc-
tivity and their potential hazards to various forms of life.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest utility analysis as
a framework for structuring a systematic decision-making
process to determine public policy in this area.
The Nitrogen Fertilizer Cuse
An example will illustrate the institutional context with-
in which public policy is often determined in issues of this
type. The nitrate concentrations of water in certain streams
in the state of Illinois have occasionally exceeded those
specified by public health standards. The association of these
events with increased use of chemical fertilizer containing
nitrogen led to a proposed regulation to limit the quantities
of chemical fertilizer used by farmers (Illinois Pollution
Control Board, 1971). Under current legislation, authority to
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enact such a regulation is vested in the Illinois Pollution
Control Board. This body conducted hearings and considered
the testimony along with other evidence in making their de-
cision, a process which, incidentally, took approximately
four years and resulted in a recent (October 1975) decision
that regulation of fertilizer use was not justified.
The evidence presented to the Board included two types
of technical information: the impact of the proposed regu-
lation on (a) the efficiency of the food production system
(e.g. Parker, et al., 1974; Swanson, 1971; Taylor and Swanson,
1975; Taylor, 1975), and (b) health and environmental hazards
(e.g. National Research Council 1972; Illinois Institute for
Environmental Quality, 1974; u.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 1973). Information on the linkages between on-farm
fertilizer use and water quality (Parker, et al., 1974) was
also presented.
In additon to the technical information, various special
interest groups presented their views and recommendations on
the proposed regulation, largely in terms of impact on their
constituencies. The estimated differential impact of the pro-
posed regulation on various groups (farmers, consumers, environ-
mentalists, etc.) is an important aspect of policy evaluation.
one of the difficult tasks of the Board was to distinguish
between that testimony which constituted technical information
about the impact of the proposed regulation, and that which
indicated the preferences of the various groups. Ideally,
the decisions made by the Board reflect their judgment of what
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constitutes the "public interest", and this judgment will
depend, in part, on their assessment of information from special
interest groups.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
Conventional benefit-cost analysis would need substantial
modification in order to be used in analysis of policy alter-
natives relating to the potential hazards of chemicals used
in agriculture. The modifications required go beyond those
often suggested (Sewell, 1973). Specific difficulties in
using cost-benefit analysis in problems of this nature have
been noted previously (Norgaard, 1975).
The crux of many decisions involving the use of hazardous
materials lies in balancing the uncertainty of damage to human
and animal life with the relatively certain benefits. The
social value of the benefits from the use of agricultural
chemicals may often be valued directly by the use of market
prices or by some add'ustment of these prices. However, the
hazards cannot often be measured in monetary units.
Although benefit-cost analyses often handle (though not
rigorously) the adjustments of benefits and costs by dis-
counting with a risk factor (e.g. Baecher et al., 1975;
Hirshleifer and Shapiro, 1969), in the kinds of decisions we
are dealing with here, the risk itself is the heart of the
matter. (In the adjustment process the risk factor is ｵ ｳ ｵ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｹ
assumed to depend on the standard deviation; this method ig-
nores the fact that preference for risk may depend on more
than the mean and standard deviation.) Thus, rather than
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viewing the choices in terms of conventional benefit-cost
analysis, a "benefit-hazard" analysis may provide a better
focus on the central issues for policy-makers.
It is also characteristic of these policy decisions that
we have not only the problem of incorporating uncertainty
into the analysis, but also that of aggregating estimates of
different kinds of hazards (disease, death, etc.) to different
forms of life. Thus, the public-policy decision framework
should provide a means for analyzing and combining various
hazards and benefits. In the following sections we present
the elements of a framework that a group such as a Pollution
Control Board might use in decision problems of the kind out-
lined. Even if the procedures suggested were not followed in
detail, their consideration might lead to inproved decision-
making.
Utility Analysis
The analytic framework provided by utility theory is
chosen because of the central role of uncertainty in decisions
of the kind described. Two components of this framework may
be identified. One deals with estimation of the relevant out-
comes of various actions, and the other concerns the prefer-
ences of the decision-makers.
Estimation of Benefits and Hazards
In order to best use the analytic framework of utility
analysis, it is necessary for benefits, B, in the form of
efficiency of food production to be related in a probabilistic
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fashion to the quantity of agricultural chemicals, x, used in
the production process. Similarly, the hazard, H (for exposi-
tory purposes confined to a single species at a specified
location and point in time) from such use of chemicals must
be related to the level of x in probabilistic terms.
During a hearing, expert witnesses, one set concerned
\'lith benefits and another with hazards, might be required to
present evidence (Figure 1) on the structure of probability
distributions. Information in this form would facilitate com-
munication and permit the analysis suggested below. Normally,
one would expect witnesses to specify no more than the mean
and the variance of B or H as a function of x, and possibly
the family of the distribution. The Board might assist
witnesses in preparing their testimony to facilitate sub-
sequent analysis by Board members. The estimates of the
probability distributions of Band H, expressed as functions
of x, would then be combined by the Board into a joint density
function, which ｾ ..le write as p(B,Hlx}.
Figure 1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR BENEFIT - HAZARD DECISIONS
BENEFITS TECHNICAL
SPECIALISTS
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BENEFIT-HAZARD PROBABILITIES
POLLUTION CONTROL
BOARD
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The problem is how the uncertainty can be rigorously
incorporated in the analysis. A well-chosen objective function
on B and II is required. It would be convenient if the ex-
pected value of the objective function could serve as the guide
for necision-rnakin0. Fortunately, the expected value is what
should be maximized in the case of the von Neumann -
Horgenstern utility function (Friec1man and Savage, 1952;
Pratt, et al., 1965). The assessment and use of these
functions depends on \'lhether certain axioms are satisfied
(Baecher, et al., Ｑ ｾ Ｗ Ｕ ［ Pratt et al., 1965). It is reasonable
to expect that they would be satisfien in most rational
decision-making problems of the type yle are considering; the
mathematical problem is to maximize with respect to x,
ff U{B,il)p(B,Hlx)dBdH
\'lhere U(n, H) is the utility function over B and II. (Standard
calculus techniques can be used to find the value of x thAt
mClximizes the integral. ｾ Ｇ Ｗ ･ assume that tJ (n,H) is an increasing
function of people's preferences as reflected by the Board.)
By following the above procedure, the uncertainties involved
are taken into account in a systematic milnner.
l\ssessment of Social Preference
Although, in principle, the Board IT'embers are selected
because of their ability to represent the "public interest,"
it is likely in practice that each member will have a con-
stituency. In any event, the perceptions of the societal
preferences held ):>y Board members before the hearings may be
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modified as a result of testimony from special interest
groups (Figure 1), and provision should be made for such
modification. (Several techniques are available to aid Board
members in assessing their utility functions [Fishburn, 1967].)
Nhile the exact values of these two utility f\L"1ctions,
one for hazards and one for benefits, should be determined
by an assessment, we can say something about their shape.
They will often be of one of two forms: concave everywhere
(Figure 2), or S-shaped (Figure 3). Concave everywhere cor-
responds to the situation where, when faced with (a) a lottery
or (b) the expected value of the lottery, the expected value
will be chosen (preferred). A concave function might be ex-
pected in the follo\-ling case related to benefits. 'l'he level
of agricultural chemical use affects the index of the cost of
food (CF), a proxy for benefits. (Thus CF would replace B in
the joint probability density function which relates hazards
and benefits to levels of use of agricultural chemicals.)
Suppose that a choice exists between an index value of 100
with certainty, or a 50% chance of an index value of 70 or
130 (Figure 2). A choice of the certain value of 100 would
imply a concave shape for the utility function. The concave
shape a Is 0 co ｲ ｲ ･ ｾ ＾ ｰ ｯ ｮ ､ ｳ to the case whe re, given the s arne me an ,
the situation with tl lower variance will be preferred.
The S-shaped utility function exhibits different pref-
erence patterns over different ranges of hazards (Figure 3).
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This shape of function May characterize a situation in which
there is a rather clearly defined level of hazards around which
the decision-maker is more willing to take risks than he is at
much higher hazard levels.
Suppose that in a given watershed the number of persons
ｳ ｵ ｦ ｦ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｮ ｾ acute toxicity (AT) from the use of agricultural
chemicals are accepted as a proxy for hazards. (AT would then
be substituted for H in the joint probability density function
which relates hazards and benefits to levels of agricultural
chemical use.) Consider the choice between (a) a 50% chance of
having 40 persons suffering acute toxicity (judged to be a bad
situation) and a 50% chance of no persons affected (a value
certainly below that of a serious problem), and (b) prior know-
ledge that 20 persons will be affected, a value somewhat higher
than the one where the situation is judged to deteriorate in
terms of public response. In this case, the decision-maker might
prefer the uncertain situation (where there is a good chance
for a relatively satisfactory situation) to the certain one that
is unsatisfactory. Such behavior would correspond to the convex
portion of the utility function (upper portion of utility
function in Figure 3).
The concave portion of the utility function in Figure 3
might correspond to the following situation. Suppose that in
the same watershed the choice is between (a) a 10% chance of
having 140 persons so affected and a 90% chance of having 40
persons affected, and (b) having 50 persons so affected for
certain. A ｣ｯｮ｣ｾｶ･ shape reflects that the certain alternative
(50 persons) will be chosen (see the lmJer portion of the utility
function in Figure 3).
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Joint Utility Function
The two utility functions (one reloting to CF and one to
AT) developed by Board members would be discussed and combined
into a joint utility function. Preferences of Board members
can provide the logic for doing this, and ｳ ｾ ･ ｣ ｩ ｡ ｬ forms for
this joint utility function (and those of higher dimension)
have been described (Keeney, 1969).
Consideration of nultiple Hazards and Benefits
The utility analysis can be extended to situations where
more than one hazard or benefit must be considered, or where
impacts are unquantifiable. Host real-world evaluations of
hazards of actions involving agricultural chemicals are not
confined to a single species suffering a specific type of
damage. Benefits may also take a variety of forms, including,
for example, differential impact of changes in real cost of
food on various income groups, impact on farm income, and
the chemical industry, etc. On the other hand, some toxic
substa:nc<Js may enter the food chain and create hazards in a
wide variety of species and locations. (The unevenness of the
quali.ty of information concerning hazards should be reflected
in the associated probability distributions.) The dynamics
of the movement of the chemical substance, including changes
in its fo:r:m, as ｾ Ｇ Ｌ ･ ｬ ｬ as its location over periods of time, may
well be the most important part of hazard evaluation. Thus,
the relations among and between species, locations, and time
periods must be recognized. These interrelations are of blO
types: one is technological--ele relationship of impacts,
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both benefits and hazards, over time and space, and the other
preferential--people's preference rankings over some impact
depending on the values of other impacts. Aggregation
of multiple risks in the context of the market and technical
aspects of project appraisal have been addressed, for example,
in a World Bank publication (Reutlinger, 1970). Work is in
progress on how some of these preference patterns can be con-
veniently handled in a utility function framework (for example,
preference patterns for impacts over time are being studied
by Meyer [1969] and Bell [1975]).
Concluding Comments
In this paper we suggest that utility analysis be used
as an organizing concept in making public-policy decisions
involving benefits and hazards. l·'1e recognize that a Pollution
Control Board may not be able to spend the time necessary to
insure that the testimony they receive contains estimates of
benefits and hazards in the form of a probability distribution
function. Nevertheless, we view this as a first step tmV'ard
an improved decision-making procedure, regardless of whether
the formal estimation of utility functions follows the
receipt of this information. Further, the delineation of
information into (a) technical data dealing with outcomes of
alternati.ve actions, and (b) the preferences of society and
its various groups suggests a systematic sequence in con-
sidering the information received. Again, this view of the
testimony liTould increase the scope for improved procedures
even if assessment of utility functions did not follow.
-14-
Finally, some experiMentation should be done with actual
assessment of utility functions in situations such as those
described; this may operationally prove to be the most
effective way to indicate the need for the kinds anc forms
of information indicated.
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